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Abstract
Background: Can non-human animals comprehend and employ symbols? The most convincing empirical evidence comes
from language-trained apes, but little is known about this ability in monkeys. Tokens can be regarded as symbols since they
are inherently non-valuable objects that acquire an arbitrarily assigned value upon exchange with an experimenter. Recent
evidence suggested that capuchin monkeys, which diverged from the human lineage 35 million years ago, can estimate,
represent and combine token quantities. A fundamental and open question is whether monkeys can reason about symbols
in ways similar to how they reason about real objects.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Here we examined this broad question in the context of economic choice behavior.
Specifically, we assessed whether, in a symbolic context, capuchins’ preferences satisfy transitivity - a fundamental trait of
rational decision-making. Given three options A, B and C, transitivity holds true if A$B, B$C and A$C (where $ indicates
preference). In this study, we trained monkeys to exchange three types of tokens for three different foods. We then
compared choices monkeys made between different types of tokens with choices monkeys made between the foods.
Qualitatively, capuchins’ preferences revealed by the way of tokens were similar to those measured with the actual foods. In
particular, when choosing between tokens, monkeys displayed strict economic preferences and their choices satisfied
transitivity. Quantitatively, however, values measured by the way of tokens differed systematically from those measured
with the actual foods. In particular, for any pair of foods, the relative value of the preferred food increased when monkeys
chose between the corresponding tokens.
Conclusions/Significance: These results indicate that indeed capuchins are capable of treating tokens as symbols. However,
as they do so, capuchins experience the cognitive burdens imposed by symbolic representation.
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lexigrams to ask one another’s for the appropriate tool required
to obtain food and they readily fulfill to one another’s requests [6].
Moreover, chimpanzees trained to sort out real foods from real
tools and to categorize each of them by choosing the consistent
lexigram out of two (generically indicating one ‘food’ and the other
‘tool’) kept categorizing using the correct lexigram also when
presented with new items [7,8]. Furthermore, in a reverse-reward
contingency task [9–11], where chimpanzees failed to select a
smaller food array in order to receive a larger one, the use of
Arabic numerals (instead of food) allowed chimpanzees to
overcome their strong motivation to choose the largest between
the two food arrays and to be successful.
Little is known about the symbolic ability of non-apes. There is
some evidence that capuchin monkeys, South-American primates
that diverged from us 35 million years ago, use tokens as symbols
[12,13]. Tokens are inherently non-valuable objects that acquire
an associative value upon exchange with the experimenter [14].

INTRODUCTION
Humans have been defined ‘‘the symbolic species’’ since the use
and understanding of symbols drastically transformed our hominid
ancestors throughout evolution [1]. The acquisition of a complex
language is unparalleled in the animal realm and probably
underlies human uniqueness [2]. Besides language, humans
creatively and flexibly use a huge array of symbols, thus acquiring
information about the world without having direct experience of
all its features. The use of symbols makes it possible to travel both
in time and space and to accumulate and transmit cultural
knowledge over generations [3–5].
Whether non-human animals comprehend and employ symbols
is still an open question since symbolic competence is difficult to
test in the absence of language. The most convincing empirical
evidence of animals using symbols comes from a series of studies
on language-trained apes. Two chimpanzees learned to use
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org
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Following DeLoache’s [5] definition of symbol (‘‘something that
someone intends to represent something other than itself’’, p.66), a
token can be considered a symbol since it is arbitrarily related to its
referent through the conventions established between the
experimenter and the exchanging subject [15,16].
Numerous studies in recent years examined aspects of economic
behavior in non-human primates using tokens. For example,
tokens were used to test reactions to social inequity [17, but see
18,19], reference-dependent preferences [20], and endowment
effects [21]. In all these experiments, monkeys were typically asked
to trade with the experimenter valueless objects (the tokens) in
exchange for desirable pieces of food. Probing economic
preferences using tokens opens a number of important questions.
For example, monkeys could psychologically treat tokens as
symbols for the food they represent, similarly to how humans treat
words or money. Alternatively, exchanging tokens for food could
simply result from instrumental conditioning. In this scenario,
monkeys exchanging tokens with the experimenters would display
a behavior conceptually analogous to the behavior of pigeons
operating a lever to obtain food.
A closely related question is whether preferences monkeys reveal
by the way of tokens are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to
those they reveal when they choose between the actual foods. To
examine this issue, we adopted a behavioral paradigm that
provides a measure of the value capuchins assign to different foods.
Subjects choose between two foods, one of which is preferred,
offered in variable amounts. When offered the choice between a
unit quantity of each food, subjects choose (by definition) the
preferred food. However, if the less preferred food is offered in
sufficiently large amounts, subjects will choose it. The relative
value of the two foods can be inferred from the indifference
point—the quantity ratio for which the subject chooses either food
equally often [22–24]. Qualitatively, this behavioral paradigm
highlights two fundamental traits of economic choice behavior.
First, individuals have strict economic preferences: away from the
indifference point, their choices are typically very consistent.
Second, individuals’ choices satisfy transitivity. In other words, if
an individual is indifferent between foods X and Y and if it is
indifferent between foods Y and Z, the individual is also indifferent
between foods X and Z. Quantitatively, this behavioral paradigm
provides an operational measure of the value individuals
subjectively assign to different foods.
Transitivity is one of the main axioms of standard economic
theory and is a fundamental trait of rational decision-making
[25,26]. Only a few studies examined preference transitivity in
non-human primates. At the behavioral level, both capuchins and
rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) combine the relative value
assigned to three foods (or juices) according to transitivity [23,24].
Furthermore, when rhesus macaques are presented with binary
choices between two types of juice in variable amounts, neurons in
the orbitofrontal cortex encode the value of the offered and chosen
juices in a menu invariant way, suggesting that preference
transitivity might be rooted in the activity of these neurons [23].
In this study, we compared preferences revealed in the real (food)
and in the symbolic (token) conditions. We trained five capuchins to
associate three different foods with three different types of tokens. In
separate sessions, we then presented monkeys with pair-wise choices
between actual foods (Food condition) or between tokens associated
with the same foods (Token condition). Finally, we compared the
relative values measured using tokens with those measured with the
actual foods. Notably, the cognitive demands of this situation are
much more challenging than in previous studies carried out in
capuchins [12,13]. Indeed, in order to choose between different
quantities of tokens corresponding to qualitatively different foods,
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org

capuchins should recall the association between each token and the
corresponding food, evaluate the amount of each token array,
estimate the relative value of the two offers, and finally make up
their mind on which option to choose. We envision three possible
results. One possibility is that capuchins use the same cognitive
mechanism to reason on tokens as they do with food; as a
consequence, their performance will not differ in the two contexts.
Alternatively, capuchins could find it more difficult to deal with
tokens than with food; thus, their choice pattern will be more
consistent with transitivity with food rather than with tokens.
Finally, tokens may aid capuchins to override the incentive value of
the immediately available food, as described for chimpanzees [9–
11], and to achieve psychological distancing (i.e., to separate
cognitively from the immediate behavioral environment, thus
directing attention away from the salient features of the stimulus,
27–30). If this were the case, capuchins would deal with tokens
better than with food, and therefore their choice pattern will be
more consistent with transitivity with tokens rather than with food.

RESULTS
Five captive-born capuchin monkeys were individually tested.
Each subject was presented with a ‘‘choice apparatus’’, constituted
by a platform with two sliding trays where different quantities of
food or tokens (according to condition) were available (Figure 1).
The subject could choose one of the two offers (by pulling one of
the two sliding trays) on the basis of the amount of food or tokens
presented. In the preliminary phase, subjects were offered pairwise choices between two foods (A:B and B:C) in order to select
three foods such as A was preferred to B, and B was preferred to
C. Then, in the Food condition, preference transitivity was tested
by presenting capuchins with binary choices between different
quantities of the three foods, labeled A, B and C in decreasing
order of preference (Table 1, Video S1, S2, S3, S4). Subsequently,
in the training phase, subjects learned to exchange three valueless
tokens for the three types of food used in the Food condition
(Table 2). Finally, in the Token condition, preference transitivity
was tested by presenting capuchins with binary choices between
different quantities of the three tokens, labeled A, B and C in
decreasing order of preference (Table 1, Video S5, S6, S7, S8, S9,
S10). In each trial, after choosing an offer type capuchins were
required to exchange the token(s) selected (one at a time) before
the experimenter administered the next trial. Each token exchange
took a few seconds and it was rewarded with one piece of food.
Both in the real (food) and in the symbolic (token) conditions,
the quantities of the two items offered to the monkey for any given
item pair varied from trial to trial (Table 1). We thus obtained in
each session three choice patterns corresponding to the three item
pairs. In the Food condition, capuchins generally had strict
economic preferences (i.e., for offer types away from the
indifference point, data points were close to 0% or 100%).
Figure 2 shows the behaviour recorded in a representative session
in the Food condition. To compute relative values, we fitted each
choice pattern with a ‘‘normal sigmoid’’, and we interpreted the
underlying Gaussian as a distribution for the relative value. The
mean (m) and variance (s2) of the distribution thus represent the
estimate for the relative value and the relative error of measure
(see Methods for details).
In all sessions but one, we could evaluate the relative value of
each food pair (see below). As shown in Figure 3, in 96% of these
sessions (23 out of 24 sessions), measured relative values satisfied
value transitivity (z-test, p.0.05). This held true for all subjects, i.e.
Gal (5/5 sessions), Paprica (5/5 sessions), Robot (4/5 sessions, in
one session we could not evaluate the relative value of the A:C
2
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Figure 1. Experimental apparatus. The apparatus is positioned in front of the indoor compartment and the experimenter is nearby the
apparatus, facing the subject. The subject can reach each tray through the corresponding opening in the wire mesh (8.5 cm63.8 cm each). This
photo depicts Robot, a male capuchin, who has just selected three black plastic tokens (each corresponding to one piece of dried apricot, food C)
preferring them to one brass hook (corresponding to one cheerios, food A). Robot is exchanging the first plastic token for one piece of dried apricot.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002414.g001

food pair), Sandokan (5/5 sessions), and Carlotta (4/5 sessions, in
one session her behavior was not consistent with transitivity;
p = 0.03). For all subjects but Robot, the first session of the Food
condition was always consistent with transitivity.
In the Token condition, in 13 out of 25 sessions we could not
evaluate the relative value of at least one of the three pairs because
the subject consistently chose one of the two types of token.
Figure 4 shows the behavior recorded in one of the sessions in
which we could not evaluate the relative value of the A:C token
pair. In the remaining 12 sessions, we could evaluate the relative
values of all the three token pairs and capuchins generally had
strict economic preferences. As shown in Figure 4, in all these 12
sessions measured relative values satisfied transitivity (z-test,
p.0.05). In particular, this held true for four out of five subjects,

i.e. Gal (5/5 sessions), Paprica (4/5 sessions), Robot (2/5 sessions),
and Sandokan (1/5 sessions); for all the above subjects, the first
session of the Token condition was always consistent with
transitivity.
To compare the results obtained in the Food condition and in
the Token condition, we performed a repeated measures
MANOVA (including sessions where it was possible to evaluate
the relative value of each item pair, N = 24 in the Food condition
and N = 12 in the Token condition) . The results showed that there
was no significant relationship between the estimate of the relative
value and its variability, corresponding respectively to the mean
and variance of the Gaussian distribution (F2,2 = 11.65, p = 0.08,
g2p = 0.92). The relative value was significantly higher in the
Token condition than in the Food condition (F1,3 = 12.35,

Table 1. Type of trials presented in the Food condition and in
the Token condition for each subject and for each item pair.

Table 2. Food and token triads for each subject.

SUBJECT
SUBJECT

Carlotta

Paprica

Robot

Sandokan

Gal

ITEM PAIR

FOOD

A vs. B

2A: 1B…1A: 4B

1A: 1B…1A: 6B

B vs. C

2B: 1C…1B: 4C

2B: 1C…1B: 6C

A vs. C

2A: 1C…1A: 6C

3A: 1C…1A: 6C

A vs. B

2A: 1B…1A: 4B

2A: 1B…1A: 5B

B vs. C

2B: 1C…1B: 4C

3B: 1C…1B: 4C

A vs. C

2A: 1C…1A: 4C

2A: 1C…1A: 6C

A vs. B

2A: 1B…1A: 4B

2A: 1B…1A: 5B

B vs. C

2B: 1C…1B: 4C

3B: 1C…1B: 5C

A vs. C

2A: 1C…1A: 6C

2A: 1C…1A: 6C

A vs. B

2A: 1B…1A: 4B

2A: 1B…1A: 5B

B vs. C

2B: 1C…1B: 4C

2B: 1C…1B: 6C

A vs. C

2A: 1C…1A: 6C

1A: 1C…1A: 6C

A vs. B

2A: 1B…1A: 4B

2A: 1B…1A: 4B

B vs. C

2B: 1C…1B: 4C

3B: 1C…1B: 6C

A vs. C

2A: 1C…1A: 6C

1A: 1C…1A: 6C

Carlotta

Paprica

Robot

Sandokan

Gal

FOOD

TOKEN

cheerios

green chip

B

parmesan

black plastic tube

C

sunflower seed

brass hook

A

pistachio

black plastic tube

B

dried pineapple

brass hook

C

sunflower seed

green chip

A

cheerios

brass hook

B

black olives

green chip

C

dried apricot

black plastic tube

A

cheerios

green chip

B

dried apricot

black plastic tube

C

sunflower seed

brass hook

A

cheerios

brass hook

B

dried pineapple

green chip

C

rice krispies

black plastic tube

A items are preferred to B items, and B items are preferred to C items.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002414.t002

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002414.t001
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Figure 2. Food condition. The three panels show the choice patterns recorded for food pairs A:B, B:C and A:C, respectively. In the first panel, the x
axis represents the offer type, and different offer types are ordered by the ratio of qB / qA, where qA and qB are the quantities of foods A and B offered
to the subject. The y-axis represents the percentage of trials in which the subject chose item B. Analogously, in the second and third panel, the y-axis
represents the percentage of trials the subject chooses food C. In this session, the subject is offered cheerios as food A, dried pineapple as food B, and
rice krispies as food C. The sigmoid fits provide the relative values V(A) = 0.9 V(B), V(B) = 2.4 V(C), and V(A) = 2.2 V(C); therefore, subject’s choices
satisfy value transitivity since 0.9 * 2.4 , 2.2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002414.g002

p = 0.04, g2p = 0.80), whereas the variability in capuchins’
performance did not significantly differ across conditions
(F1,3 = 3.51, p = 0.16, g2p = 0.54).

[23,24] and with relative numerousness judgments between food or
tokens [13]. Quantitatively, however, values measured by the way of
tokens differed systematically from those measured with the actual
foods. In particular, for any pair of foods, the relative value of the
preferred food tended to increase when monkeys chose between the
corresponding tokens. As a consequence, while in the Food
condition it was generally possible to assess the relative value of
the items, in about half of the sessions carried out in the Token
condition this was not the case. The fact that choice patterns were
otherwise qualitatively similar in the two conditions suggests that by
increasing the number of the less preferred tokens (e.g., presenting
more than 6 tokens C vs. 1 token A) we might induce capuchins to
choose the less preferred but more numerous type of token.
Overall, these results suggest that capuchins use similar
cognitive mechanisms when evaluating options in both real and
symbolic contexts. Indeed, capuchins’ preferences satisfied transitivity in both contexts. At the same time, tokens were not dealt
with exactly as the food they stand for, since relative values were
higher in the Token condition than in the Food condition. Several
factors could account for this result. First, the high memory load
due to recalling the association between each token and the
corresponding food. However, high memory load should have led
to a more ‘‘noisy’’ pattern of choice in the Token condition, but
this did not seem to be the case, since the variability in capuchins’
performance (as measured by the variance s2) did not significantly
differ between the Food and Token conditions. Alternatively,
monkeys’ behavior could be explained by a decreased motivation
due to the delayed feedback inherent in token exchange. This
hypothesis seems, however, unlikely because our subjects never
refused to participate and completed all the token trials. Moreover,
the same two individuals for which tokens increased most the
relative values between item pairs (Sandokan and Carlotta) were
the best performers in a previous study on the estimation and
combination of token quantities, where temporal discounting was
at stake [12]. Nonetheless, since each token exchange for the
corresponding food takes a few seconds, we cannot rule out that
capuchins may have discounted the offers involving a higher
number of tokens [31].
Finally, the different results obtained in the Token condition
compared to the Food condition could reflect a difficulty to
achieve a dual representation [3]. Specifically, capuchins may find
it difficult to grasp the dual nature of tokens as it is the case for

DISCUSSION
Our results can be summarized as follows. Qualitatively, preferences revealed by the way of tokens were similar to those measured
with the actual foods. Specifically, when choosing between tokens,
capuchins displayed strict economic preferences and choices
satisfied transitivity since the first session for all subjects but one.
These results confirm and extend previous findings obtained in nonhuman primates faced with choices between real foods or juices

Figure 3. Food condition. The x-axis represents the product nA:B*
nB:C, the y-axis represents nA:C, and each data point represents one of
the 24 sessions consistent with value transitivity.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002414.g003
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Figure 4. Token condition. The three panels show the choice patterns recorded for token pairs A:B, B:C and A:C. Here the subject is offered green
chips as tokens A (corresponding to one cheerios each), black plastic tubes as tokens B (corresponding to one piece of dried apricot each), and brass
hooks as tokens C (corresponding to one sunflower seed each). The sigmoid fits provide the relative values V(A) = 2.8 V(B) and V(B) = 4.3 V(C);
however, when facing the choice between one token A and up to six tokens C, this subject always chose the single token A, thus we could not
evaluate the relative value of A vs. C.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002414.g004

young children. In humans, the understanding and use of symbolic
artifacts develops slowly because simultaneously representing both
the concrete object itself and its abstract relation to what it stands
for is complex [5]. DeLoache and colleagues have extensively
investigated how young children use scale models (i.e., realistic
miniature models of a familiar playroom) as a source of
information for solving a retrieval problem. In a typical trial,
children observed an experimenter hide a miniature toy in the
model and were then asked to find the larger toy in the analogous
location of the playroom. Children understanding of the modelplayroom relation and the ability to successfully find the
corresponding larger toy in the playroom developed between 2.5
and 3.0 years of age [3–5]. In chimpanzees tested in a similar
version of this task, only a few individuals could inhibit
perseverative object-oriented responses and successfully retrieved
the hidden item [11].
Young children seem to fail in the scale model task because they
are attentive to the real object rather than to what it stands for.
When the salience of the model is decreased (for example
substituting the scale model with a video clip), or when there is
no need for dual representation (children are told that a ‘‘shrinking
machine’’ transformed the playroom into the miniature model),
performance improves. In contrast, performance declines when
the physical salience of the scale model is increased by allowing
children to play with the model before performing the task [3,5]. A
similar phenomenon might explain our results. In the Token
condition capuchins might have focused on the quality of the
preferred token disregarding the quantities of the two alternatives,
thus choosing this token more often than the corresponding food
in the Food condition. Future studies should assess whether
preventing the physical interaction with tokens by eliminating the
exchange procedure modifies capuchins’ performance.
Interestingly, in humans a complete appreciation of the
symbolic nature of tokens took long time to be achieved [32].
Around 8500 years B.C. the Sumerians started keeping track of
trades by employing a system based on small clay tokens shaped
differently depending on the good they stood for. The evolution of
this token system reflected Sumerians’ socioeconomic development. As their trades expanded, Sumerians needed to transport
tokens in clay pots and, to readily identify the content of each pot,
they engraved on their surfaces the type and number of the tokens
contained. Nonetheless, Sumerians did not immediately realized
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org

how abstract this symbolic system could be and only after several
millennia both number representation and writing evolved from
the engraved clay pots.
Finally, the increased abstraction of the Token condition did not
ameliorate capuchins’ performance, as reported for chimpanzees
[9–11] and young children [30,33,34] when symbolic representations substituted for real food. Again, limited mastery of the dual
nature of tokens may have prevented capuchins from achieving
psychological distancing [27–30]; however, this hypothesis requires further studies examining whether tokens enhance performance in tasks where inhibition is critical for success.
In conclusion, capuchin monkeys’ behavior with tokens is not
simply the product of instrumental conditioning, though tokens
have not gained yet the status of human money. Our findings
suggest that capuchins indeed treat tokens as symbols, despite
experiencing the cognitive burdens imposed by symbolic representation. Thus, also non-apes have undertaken the path of symbol
use and understanding, though they are far from achieving full
symbolic competence.

MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects and apparatus
Five captive-born capuchin monkeys (three males, two females,
average 15.4 years, range 7–23) were tested. All subjects were
already proficient in token exchange and had experience in
cognitive and number-related tasks [12,13]. No subject but one
(Robot) had already participated in a previous study on transitivity
of food preferences [24].
They lived in three groups at the Primate Center of the Institute
of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies of CNR, Rome; each
group was housed in indoor–outdoor compartments (total area:
65.4–139.5 m3, depending on group size) and tested in one of the
two indoor compartments (12.2 m3 each, for all groups). All
compartments were furnished with wooden perches, tree trunks
and branches. Separation for individual testing was achieved by
splitting the group into smaller units by means of sliding doors and
then allowing one individual to enter the indoor compartment.
This procedure was part of the daily routine. Monkeys were not
food deprived for testing. The main meal took place in the
afternoon when fresh fruits, vegetables and monkey chow were
provided. Water was available ad libitum. This study complied with
5
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protocols approved by the Italian Health Ministry and all
procedures were performed in full accordance with the European
law on humane care and use of laboratory animals.
Subjects were tested individually in the indoor compartment;
the apparatus was a black plastic table (65 cm664 cm613.5 cm)
with two sliding aluminum trays (6.5640 cm; 2.5 cm high),
positioned at 32 cm distance from one another. Each tray had
two holes (1.4 cm in diameter), one at each end; one served to
allow the subject’s pulling, whereas the other hole allowed the
experimenter to block the tray by inserting a pin into it. All
subjects were already familiar with the apparatus [12,13]. The
experiment proceeded in phases. In the preliminary phase,
subjects were tested for their binary food preferences. Subsequently, preference transitivity was tested in choices between foods
(Food condition). Then, in the training phase, subjects learned to
exchange tokens for food. Finally, preference transitivity was tested
in choices between tokens (Token condition).

In each trial capuchins could face a binary choice between: (1)
one or two pieces of food A and one to four pieces of food B, (2)
one or two pieces of food B and one to four pieces of food C, and
(3) one or two pieces of food A and one to six pieces of food C. In a
session, each comparison was presented four times. For each food
pair, according to each individual’s indifference point, the type
and number of trials presented varied across sessions, from a
minimum of 60 to a maximum of 64 trials per session; no subject
received all the possible 72 comparisons within a session (Table 1).
The left/right arrangement of the offers was counterbalanced
within each session. Each subject received one session a day for a
total of five sessions. All the other features of the procedure were
the same as in the preliminary phase.

Token condition
The same five capuchins were presented with the Token
condition after completing all the five sessions in the Food
condition. We used the same subjects and apparatus as in the Food
condition.
(a) Tokens. Tokens were objects of similar dimensions,
differing in shape, material and color; in particular, we used
green chips, black plastic tubes, and brass hooks. These objects
were familiar to the subjects but never used in previous studies.
The three tokens were pseudo-randomly assigned to the three
types of food across subjects (Table 2).
(b) Training. Subjects learned to associate each type of token
to one of the three foods used in the Food condition (Table 2).
Therefore, token A was associated with the high-preferred food,
token B with the medium-preferred food, and token C with the
low-preferred food. The training procedure consisted of placing 12
tokens of the same type (i.e., associated to the same type of food)
into the indoor compartment, and repeatedly saying ‘give me’ to
the monkey while requesting a token, with left hand outstretched
and palm up. The reward was given upon the placement of one
token into the experimenter’s left hand. There was a 10-s interval
between one trial and the next one. Incorrect exchanges, in which
tokens were thrown or incorrectly placed into the experimenter’s
hand, were not rewarded. Moreover, when the subject did not
exchange a token within 30 s, the trial was considered incorrect
and a new trial started after 10 s.
Subjects received a training session per day. Each session
consisted of two blocks of 12 trials each, for a total of 24 trials.
Criterion was set at 90% correct responses within two consecutive
sessions. Each subject was trained to exchange one type of token
(A, B, or C) at a time, and the order in which they learned to
exchange the three tokens was randomly determined. When
criterion was reached for all types of token, subjects received nine
sessions of consolidation with tokens A, B and C alternated across
days. Capuchins completed training (including the nine sessions of
consolidation) in an average of 18.261.7 sessions. In particular,
they reached criterion in an average of 2.860.4 sessions for token
A (range: 2–4), 2.860.8 sessions for token B (range: 2–6), and
3.461.4 sessions for token C (range: 2–9). The rate of training of
the present study is similar to that reported for capuchins learning
to associate different type of tokens with different quantities of food
[12,13].
(c) Procedure. In each session, capuchins faced binary
choices between different quantities of three tokens (A:B, B:C,
and A:C). Before the beginning of each session, nine
familiarization trials were carried out by presenting for three
times all the possible pair-wise comparisons between the three
tokens (one token of each type). According to subjects’ preferences,
tokens were referred to as token A (associated to the high-preferred

Preliminary phase
Capuchins’ preference for two pairs of foods (A:B and B:C, see
below) was assessed. First, we carried out the preference test for the
pair A:B, and then for the pair B:C. In each session, capuchins
faced binary choices between different quantities of a pair (A:B or
B:C). Before the beginning of each session, eight familiarization
trials were carried out by presenting pair-wise comparisons
between the two foods (one piece each). According to subjects’
preferences, foods were referred to as food A (high-preferred) and
food B (low-preferred). Similarly, when testing the other food pair,
foods were referred to as food B (high-preferred) and food C (lowpreferred). Individual preferences varied so that labels A, B, and C
referred to different foods for different subjects (Table 2).
For the A:B pair, in each trial capuchins faced a binary choice
between one or two pieces of food A and one to five pieces of food
B. Therefore, the following comparisons were presented: 2A:1B,
1A:1B, 1A:2B, 1A:3B, 1A:4B, and 1A:5B; each combination was
presented eight times for a total of 48 trials in a pseudo-random
order. The left/right arrangement of the offers was counterbalanced within each session. Each subject received one session a day
for a total of five sessions. The same procedure was employed for
the B:C pair.
Testing was carried out by two experimenters: experimenter 1
sat in front of the subject’s indoor compartment, with the
apparatus placed on the floor between the experimenter and the
capuchins’ compartment. Placed between the experimenters were
two opaque containers, each containing pieces of one type of food.
Experimenter 2 sat next to experimenter 1 and during baiting she
covered the apparatus with an opaque screen to prevent the
subject from seeing the process. Then, experimenter 2 lifted the
opaque screen and experimenter 1 pushed the apparatus towards
the wire mesh, so that the monkey could pull one of the two trays.
Both experimenters refrained from looking at the apparatus so as
not to provide cues to the subject. The inter-trial interval was
about 10 s.

Food condition
In each session, capuchins faced choices between different
quantities of three foods, labeled A, B and C in decreasing order of
preference. Choices were binary and trials with the three pairs of
foods (A:B, B:C and C-A) were interleaved pseudo-randomly.
Before the beginning of each session, nine familiarization trials
were carried out by presenting for three times all the possible pairwise comparisons between the three foods (one piece of food of
each type). Foods were referred to as food A (high-preferred), food
B (medium-preferred), and food C (low-preferred).
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org

6

June 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 6 | e2414

Transitivity in Monkeys

Video S2 Food condition. Carlotta has a choice between one
cheerios (food A, on the left) and three sunflower seeds (food C, on
the right). She selects the single cheerios by pulling the
corresponding tray.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002414.s002 (4.78 MB
MPG)

food), token B (associated to the medium-preferred food), and
token C (associated to the low-preferred food).
In each trial capuchins could face a binary choice between: (1)
one or two tokens A and one to six tokens B, (2) one to three
token(s) B and one to six token(s) C, and (3) one or two token(s) A
and one to six token(s) C. In each trial, after choosing an offer type
capuchins were required to exchange the token(s) selected (one at a
time) before the experimenter administered the next trial; each
token exchange took a few seconds and was rewarded with one
piece of food (Table 2). Typically, capuchins exchanged correctly,
and in the very few cases in which they did not do so, the
experimenter gave the token back to the subject so that s/he could
exchange it again.
In a session, each comparison was presented four times. For
each token pair, according to each individual’s indifference point,
the type and number of trials presented varied across sessions,
from a minimum of 60 to a maximum of 76 trials per session in a
pseudo-random order; no subject received all the possible 88
comparisons within a session (Table 1). The left/right arrangement of the offers was counterbalanced within each session. Each
subject received one session a day for a total of five sessions. All the
other features of the procedure were the same as in the Food
condition. The study took place between February and May 2007.

Video S3 Food condition. Carlotta has a choice between three
sunflower seeds (food C, on the left) and one piece of parmesan
cheese (food B, on the right). She selects the three sunflower seeds
by pulling the corresponding tray.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002414.s003 (4.56 MB
MPG)
Video S4 Food condition. Carlotta has a choice between five
sunflower seeds (food C, on the left) and one cheerios (food A, on
the right). She selects the five sunflower seeds by pulling the
corresponding tray.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002414.s004 (5.82 MB
MPG)
Video S5 Token condition. Carlotta has a choice between one
green poker chip (token A, corresponding to one cheerios, on the
left) and three brass hooks (token C, corresponding to one
sunflower seed each, on the right). She selects the token A by
pulling the corresponding tray.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002414.s005 (5.28 MB
MPG)

Analysis of choice patterns
We analyzed choice patterns using the method employed by
Padoa-Schioppa & Assad [22,23]. We refer to ‘‘relative’’ values
because behavioral analyses allow measuring quantities of different
goods on a common value scale up to a scaling factor. Our
measure of relative value rests on the assumption of linear
indifference curves: if a monkey is repeatedly offered the choice
between quantities qX and qY of items X and Y (offer qYY : qXX),
the rate of ‘‘Y’’ choices only depends on the ratio qY / qX [23].
Choice patterns recorded for each pair of items X and Y are
expressed as a function of log(qY / qX), where qX and qY are,
respectively, the quantities of items X and Y offered to the
monkey. For each item pair, we then fit the percentage of ‘‘Y’’
choices with a normal sigmoid, which is a normal cumulative
distribution function of the form S(x) = # x2‘ = N (t, m, s) dt. We
interpret the underlying Gaussian (which has mean m and variance
s2) as a probability distribution for the log relative value, and we
compute the estimated relative value of the two items n = exp(m).
The relative value corresponds to the indifference point, i.e. the
ratio of quantities for which the monkey would choose either item
equally often. We indicate with V(X) the value of X, and with nX:Y
the relative value of items X and Y, such that V(X) = nX:Y V(Y).
For each session, we thus obtain the three probability distributions
for the log relative values u = log(nA:B), v = log(nB:C) and
w = log(nA:C). Under the assumption of linear indifference curves,
indifference transitivity is satisfied if the following relationship
holds statistically true: nA:B * nB:C = nA:C. We refer to this
condition as ‘‘value transitivity.’’ Testing whether values satisfy
transitivity reduces to testing whether the identity u+v = w holds
statistically true. Because u, v and w are all normally distributed
variables, transitivity violations can be identified with a z-test [23].

Video S6 Token condition. Carlotta has a choice between three
black plastic tubes (token B, corresponding to one piece of
parmesan cheese each, on the left) and one green poker chip
(token A, corresponding to one cheerios, on the right). She selects
the three tokens B by pulling the corresponding tray.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002414.s006 (9.35 MB
MPG)
Video S7 Token condition. Carlotta has a choice between one
black plastic tube (token B, corresponding to one piece of
parmesan cheese, on the left) and three brass hooks (token C,
corresponding to one sunflower seed each, on the right). She
selects the single token B by pulling the corresponding tray.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002414.s007 (6.34 MB
MPG)
Video S8 Token condition. Carlotta has a choice between one
black plastic tube (token B, corresponding to one piece of
parmesan cheese, on the left) and four brass hooks (token C,
corresponding to one sunflower seed each, on the right). She
selects the four tokens C by pulling the corresponding tray.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002414.s008 (10.39 MB
MPG)
Video S9 Token condition. Carlotta has a choice between one
green poker chip (token A, corresponding to one cheerios, on the
left) and five brass hooks (token C, corresponding to one sunflower
seed each, on the right). She selects the single token A by pulling
the corresponding tray.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002414.s009 (5.53 MB
MPG)

Supporting Information

Token condition. Carlotta has a choice between six
brass hooks (token C, corresponding to one sunflower seed each,
on the left) and one green poker chip (token A, corresponding to
one cheerios, on the right). She selects the six tokens C by pulling
the corresponding tray.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002414.s010 (12.60 MB
MPG)

Video S10

Video S1 Food condition. Carlotta, a female capuchin, has a

choice between one cheerios (food A, on the left) and three pieces
of parmesan cheese (food B, on the right). She selects the three
pieces of parmesan cheese by pulling the corresponding tray.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002414.s001 (4.79 MB
MPG)
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